Outline

- 1) Uniformly most powerful tests
- 2) Two-sided tests
- 3) p-Values
 - 4) Confidence Regions

Uniformly most powerful tests General setup: 3, 000, 00, Def If $\phi^*(x)$ has sig. level α , and for any other level- α test ϕ we have Eθ* ≥ Eθ YOE(H), then pt is uniformly most powerful (ump) Typically only exist for 1-sided testing in certain 1-parameter families. Det A model P is identifiable if $\theta_1 \neq \theta_2 \implies P_{\theta_1} \neq P_{\theta_2} \quad (\exists A : P_{\theta_1}(A) \neq P_{\theta_2}(A))$ Det Assume $P = \{P_o : \Theta \in H \in R\}$ has densities P_o , and is identifiable. We say P_o has monotone likelihood ratios (MLR) if there is some statistic T(X) s.t. $\frac{\rho_{e_z}}{\rho_{e_z}}(x)$ is a nondecreasing function of T(x)for any 0, (02 [some T(x) for all 0's] $\left(\frac{c}{o} = \infty \text{ if } c > 0, \frac{o}{o} \text{ undef.}\right)$ Ex. Exp. fan: e(7,-70) ET(x) - n(A(7,1)-A(70)) / in ET(xi) Theorem Assume & has MLR, test Ho: 0 = 0 vs $H_1: \Theta > \Theta_0$ at level $\alpha = (0, 1)$ Let $\phi^*(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & T(x) < c \\ \gamma & T(x) = c \end{cases}$ T(x) > c with c, γ chosen so $E_{\theta_0} \phi^*(x) = \alpha \in (0,1)$ a) ϕ * is a UMP level-or test b) $\beta(\theta) = E_{\theta} \phi^{*}(x)$ is non-decreasing in θ , strictly incr. wherever $\beta(\theta) \in (0,1)$ c) If $\theta, < \theta_0$ then ϕ^* minimizes $E_{\theta}, \phi(x)$ among all tests with Ego Ø(K) = x

Proof b) Suppose $\theta_1 < \theta_2$, then $\frac{\rho_{\theta_2}}{\rho_{\theta_1}}(x)$ is = nondecreasing function of T(X)I maybe not "the"

Def is a LRT for Ho: $\theta = \theta$, us $\theta = \theta$. at level $\tilde{\alpha} = \mathbb{E}_{\theta_1} p^*(x)$ By Cor. 12.4, $E_{\theta_2}\phi(x) \geq E_{\theta_1}\phi(x)$, strict ineq. unless both = 0 or 1 a) Suppose 0, >00 and of has level =d \Rightarrow $\mathbb{E}_{\Theta_1} \phi^*(X) \ge \mathbb{E}_{\Theta_1} \widetilde{\phi}(X)$ since ϕ^* is a LRT for $H_0: \Theta = \Theta_0$ us. $H_i: \Theta = \Theta_i$ c) $\theta_1 < \theta_0$, assume $E_{\theta_0} \tilde{\phi}(x) = E_{\theta_0} \phi^*(x) = \alpha$ Both 1-p*, 1-p* are tests of $H_0:0=0$ or H:0=0both have sig. level 1-a $1-\phi^*$ is a LRT since $\frac{\rho_1}{\rho_0}(X)$ is non-iner. in T(X) $\Rightarrow \mathbb{E}_{0}(1-\tilde{p}) \leq \mathbb{E}_{0}(1-\tilde{p}^{*}) = 1-\kappa$ Intuition pt is a LRT for Ho:0=0, vs H:0=0, for any pair 0, co (sig. level depends on 0,)

This lets us extend our simple vs. simple result to (a very special case of) composite vs comp.

Two-sided Alternatives

Sety:
$$\beta = \int_{\Theta} : \Theta \in \Theta \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{2}$$
, $\Theta \in \Theta^{\circ}$

Test $H_{o}: \Theta = \Theta_{o}$ vs. $H_{i}: \Theta \neq \Theta_{o}$

(Can be generalized naturally to $H_{o}: \Theta \in [0,, \Theta_{o}]$)

Def A real-valued statistic $T(x)$ is stochastically increasing in Θ if

 $P_{\Theta}(T(x) \leq t)$ is non-incr. in θ , $\forall t$

Assume $T(x)$ is a stochastically increasing summary test statistic

 $P_{\Theta}(X) = \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{i} d_{i} \rho(X_{i} - \Theta)$ (location family)

 $P_{\Theta}(X_{i}) = \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{i} d_{i} \rho(X_{i}) \rho(X_{i})$

Ex X: $\frac{11}{9}\rho(x_0)$ (scale family) T(x) = $\sum x_i^2$ or median ($1x_1,...,1x_n1$) Two-tailed test rejects when T(X) is "extreme"

$$\phi(x) = \begin{cases} 1 & T(x) < c_1 \\ 0 & T(x) \in (c_1, c_2) \\ 7i & T(x) = ci \end{cases}$$

Let
$$\alpha_1 = P_{\theta_0}(T = c_1) + \gamma_1 P_{\theta_0}(T = c_1)$$
 γ_2 similar for upper tail

Need &, + &z = a, but how to balance?

Idea 1: Equal-tailed test:
$$q_1 = q_2 = \frac{y}{2}$$

$$\int_{0}^{T(t)} \int_{0}^{x} dx$$

Def $\phi(x)$ is unbiased if inf $E_{\Theta}\phi(x) \ge d$

Idea 2: Unbiased test: ensure min B(0) = 4

$$\begin{cases} usually & \Longrightarrow \frac{d\beta_{\phi}(\theta_{0})}{d\theta_{0}} = 0 \end{cases}$$

Theorem Assume $X_i \stackrel{iid}{\sim} e^{\Theta T(x) - A(x)} h(x)$ Ho: O & [0, 02] vs H: 0 < 0, or 0 > 0, (possibly $\Theta_1 = \Theta_2$)

Then

(resecting for live)

extreme of)

a) The unbiased test based on ST(Xi) with sig. level = x is UMP among all unbiased tests (uMPu) b) If $\theta_1 < \theta_2$ the UMPU test can be found by solving for c_i , γ_i θ_i , θ_z θ_z θ_z θ_z θ_z c) If 0,=0=00 the UMPU test can be found by solving for cisti s.t. $\mathbb{E}_{\theta_o} \phi(x) = \alpha$ and $\frac{d\beta_{\phi}}{d\theta}(\theta_{0}) = \mathbb{E}_{\theta_{0}} \Big[\sum T(X_{i}) \Big(\phi(X) - \omega \Big) \Big] = 0$

(Proof in Keener)

p-Values

Informal definition: Suppose
$$\phi(x)$$
 rejects for large values of $T(x)$.

$$\rho(x) = {}^{\circ}P_{H_0}(T(x) \ge T(x))$$

$$= \sup_{\theta \in \Theta_0} P_{\theta}(T(x) \ge T(x))$$

Ex
$$X \sim N(0,1)$$
 $H_0: \theta = 0$ vs. $H_1: \theta \neq 0$

Two-sided test rejects for large $T(X) = |X|$
 $(\Leftrightarrow \phi(X) = 1\{|X| > \frac{2}{2}\omega_{12}\})$

The two-sided ρ -value is $\rho(X)$ where

 $\rho(x) = P_0(|X| > |x|)$
 $= 2(|1 - \Phi(|x|))$

For $H_0: |\theta| < J$ vs. $H_1: |\theta| > J$:

 $\rho(x) = P_1(|X| > |x|)$
 $= P_2(|X| > |x|)$
 $= P_2(|X| > |x|)$

$$P(x) = P_{5}(|x| > |x|) \qquad (= P_{5}("))$$

$$= 1 - \Phi(|x| - 5) + \Phi(-|x| - 5)$$

etc.-

Formal definition: 3, 4, 4. Assume we have a test ϕ_{α} for each significance level, sup $\mathbb{E}_{\theta}\phi(x) \leq \alpha$ (non-randomized case: $\phi_{\alpha} = 1(x \in R_{\alpha})$) Assume tests are monotone in x: if $\alpha_1 \leq \alpha_2$ than $\beta_{\alpha_1}(x) \leq \beta_{\alpha_2}(x)$ (non-randonized: Rx, E Rx2) Then $p(x) = \inf\{x: \phi_{\alpha}(x) = 1\}$ (= inf(x: x ∈ Ra?) (possible to define randomized p-value but not worth it) Note $p(x) \le \alpha \iff p_{\alpha}(x) = 1 \ \forall \ \alpha > \alpha$ For $\theta \in \Theta_0$, $\mathbb{P}_{\theta}(\rho(x) \leq a) \leq \inf_{\alpha > \alpha} \mathbb{P}_{\theta}(\phi_{\alpha}(x) = 1) \leq \alpha$ => p-value stochastically dominates u[0,1] If par rejects for large T(X), coincides with informal definition

Note the p-value depends on . the model & null hyp., the data, AND . the choice of test

 $E_{X} \quad X \sim N_{s}(\theta, I_{d}) \quad H_{s}: \theta = 0 \text{ is } H_{s}: \theta \neq 0$ $We \quad can \quad se \quad T_{s}(x) = ||x||^{2} \quad (\chi^{2} \text{ test})$ $or \quad T_{2}(x) = ||x||_{\infty} \quad (max \text{ test})$ $= \max_{i} ||x_{i}||_{\infty}$

Very different p-values / power if d large (choice reflects belief about whether O is sparse)

Confidence Sets

- Accept/reject decision only so interesting:

 · usually we care how big & is
 - · tiny p-value doesn't imply big 0 (big p-value doesn't imply small 0 either)

Def P= PB:0= D3

C(X) is a 1-x confidence set for g(0) if

 $P_{\theta}(C(X) \ni g(\theta)) \ge 1-d$, $\forall \theta \in \Theta$ Subject object verb

We say C(x) covers $g(\theta)$ if $c(x) \ni g(\theta)$ $P_{\theta}(c(x) \ni g(\theta))$ is coverage probability

inf $P(c \ni g(\theta))$ is conf. level

· C(X) is random, not g(8)

- . Often misinterpreted as Bayesian guarantee
- . Say "C(x) has a 95% chance of covering" NOT "g(0) hes a 95% chance of being in c' NEVER "95% chance g(0) & [0.5, 1.5]" (e.g.)

Duality of Testing & Confidence Sets

Suppose we have a level-or test $\phi(x; a)$

of $H_0: g(\theta) = a$ vs. $H_0: g(\theta) \neq a$, $\forall a \in g(\Theta)$

We can use it to make a confidence set for g(0):

Let $C(X) = \{a: \phi(x;a) < 1\}$

= "all non-rejected values of 0"

Then $\mathbb{P}_{\Theta}(C(x) \neq g(\theta)) = \mathbb{P}_{\Theta}(\phi(x; g(\theta)) = 1)$

≤

∀0

Alternatively, suppose C(X) is a 1-x confidence set for $g(\theta)$.

We can see C to construct a test $\phi(x)$ of $H_0: g(\theta) = a$ vs. $H_i: g(\theta) \neq a$

 $\phi(x) = 1\{a \notin C(x)\}$

For θ s.t. $g(\theta) = a$:

 $\mathbb{F}_{\theta} \phi(x) = \mathbb{P}_{\theta} (c(x) \not\ni g(\theta)) \leq d$

This is called investing the test

Confidence Intervals / Bounds

If
$$C(x) = [C_1(x), C_2(x)]$$
 we say

 $C(x)$ is a confidence interval (CI)
 $C(x) = [C_1(x), \infty)$: lower conf. bd. (LCE)
 $C(x) = [C_1(x), \infty)$: upper conf bd. (LCE)

We usually get LCE / LCE by inverting a one-sided test in appropriate direction

 $Called$ uniformly most accurate (LCE)

Get CI by inverting a two-sided test

Called uman if test is UMPU

LCB: Invert test for
$$H_0: \Theta \leq \Theta_0$$

Solve $\alpha = |P_0(X > c(Q_0))| = e^{-c(\Theta_0)/\Theta_0}$
 $c(Q_0) = \theta_0 |og(Y_0)| (>0)$
 $X \leq c(\Theta_0) \implies \Theta_0 \geq \frac{X}{|og|}$
 $C(X) = \left[\frac{X}{|og|}, \infty\right]$

UCB: Similar,
$$C(X) = (-\infty, \frac{X}{-\log(1-\alpha)}]$$

Equal-tailed CI:

Invert equal-tailed test of
$$H_0: \Theta = \Theta_0$$

$$\oint_{\alpha}^{2T} (X) = \oint_{\alpha/2}^{2\theta_0} (X) + \oint_{\alpha/2}^{6\theta_0} (X)$$

$$\underbrace{H_0: \Theta = \Theta_0}_{\alpha/2} = \Theta_0$$

$$C(X) = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{X}{-\log^{2} 2}, co \end{pmatrix} \cap (-co, \frac{X}{-\log(1-42)})$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} \frac{X}{-\log^{2} 2}, -\log(1-\frac{4}{2}) \end{bmatrix}$$

(Mis-) Interpreting Hypothesis Tests

Hypothesis tests ubiquitous in science Common misinterpretations:

1) p < 0.05 therefore "there is an effect"
or "the effect size = the estimate"

a) p > 0.05 therefore "there is no effect"

3) $p = 10^{-6}$ therefore "the effect is huge"

4) $p = 10^{-6}$ therefore "the data are signif."

and everything about our model

is correct in most naive interp.

5) Effect CI for men is [0.2, 3.2],

for women is [-0.2, 2.8] therefore

"there is an effect for men and not

for women."

378) We rejected a specific, parametric null model therefore something interesting is happening

How to interpret testing

Learning about the world from data is not easy or automatic! Hypothesis tests let us ask specific questions about specific data sets under specific modeling assumptions, using specific testing method. All of these choices bear on the interpretation. Top-tier miedical journals let people publish claims, reporting p-values without saying what model was used or what test was employed Pretty ontrageous when you think about it! Hyp. tests can be a good companion to

"All models are wrong, some are useful" but need experience and theory to understand when assumptions do or don't cause real trouble

Conceptual Objections

- Q1: Why should I test Ho: 0=0? No 0 is ever exactly 0.
- A1: a) Test $H_0: |\theta| \le J$ if you want! If s.e.($\hat{\theta}$) = 105, not much difference.
 - b) Most two-sided tests justify directional inference.

 "If T> con declare O = 0, if T < c,

 declare O < 0" with P(false claim) < 9
 - e.g. $H_0: P=Q$ us $H_1: P\neq Q$ for perm. test, but alternative frameworks like Boyes force very strong assumptions on us.
- Q2: People only like frequents t results like p-values, CIs be cause they mistake them for Beyesian results.
- 95% chance $C(X) \ni O$ is misinferpreted as a claim about $\rho(O|X)$.
- Ad: True, but subjective Bayesian results often misinterpreted as "the posterior dist. of O" when really should be "my posterior opinion about O"

- b) "Objective" Bayesian credible intervals are even worse: "nobody's posterior opinion about O"
- c) Cave at: in some simple, low-dim., high signal settings, can may be say "any reasonable persons posterior opinion about O." Then Bayes methods probably best!
- Q3: p-values ignore P(Data | H,) and only look at P(Data | Ho). Data might be more likely under Ho but still reject.
- A3: $P(Data)H_0$, $P(Data|H_1)$ only make sense for simple null/alternative. Even in $N(\theta, 1)$ $H_0: \theta = 0$, what is $P(X = 2.21 H_1)$?
 - If H, is vague prior like $\Theta \sim N(0, 10^6)$,
 then $X \sim N(0, 10^6 + 1)$ and $P(41H_1) << P(41H_6)$ Will scientists understand this?
 - Even bigger problems in high-dim, hierarchical, or nonparametric priors.

Q4: Scientists always misuse hypothesis testing, so we should switch to something else

(confidence intervals / Bayes / weird new idea)

A4: a) CIs great, but just a re-packaging of hypothesis tests. (Might still be good for staving off some common misinterpretations by naifs)

- b) Bayes has its uses, but forcing scientists to make more choices / assumptions is not going to solve problem of scientist incentives / ignorance
 - 6) Most weird new ideas have bigger issues but just haven't been criticized much yet b/c no one but proponents care.
 - d) Statistical inference will never be idiotproof, b/c science / critical thinkring are
 not idiot-proof. Engineers have to learn
 calculus, learning what a p-value means is
 not that hard. Ask for help if you need it!

 (Corollary for Statisticians: don't be jerks)