Trustworthy Elections: Evidence and Dispute Resolution

2019 Def Con Las Vegas, NV

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9 August 2019

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Suitably designed and operated paper-based voting systems can be strongly software independent, contestable, and defensible, and they can make risk-limiting audits and evidence-based elections possible. (These terms will be defined.) Not all paper-based voting systems have these properties. Systems that rely on ballot-marking devices and voter verifiable paper audit trails produced by electronic voting machines generally do not, because they cannot provide appropriate evidence for dispute resolution, which has received scant attention. An ideal system allows voters, auditors, and election officials to provide public evidence of any problems they observe—and can provide convincing public evidence that the reported electoral outcomes are correct despite any problems that might have occurred, if they are correct.

Many collaborators including (most recently) Andrew Appel, Josh Benaloh, Matt Bernhard, Rich DeMillo, Steve Evans, Alex Halderman, Mark Lindeman, Kellie Ottoboni, Ron Rivest, Peter Ryan, Vanessa Teague, Poorvi Vora, Dan Wallach

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- Whom must we trust, and for what?

Why audit?

- Any way of counting votes can make mistakes
- Every electronic system is vulnerable to bugs, configuration errors, & hacking
- Did error/bugs/hacking cause losing candidate(s) to appear to win?

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Not electronic systems.

- If there's a reliable, voter-verified paper trail, can check whether reported winner really won.
- If you permit a small "risk" of not correcting the reported outcome if it is wrong, generally don't need to look at many ballots if outcome is right.


A risk-limiting audit has a known chance of correcting the reported outcome if the reported outcome is wrong (and doesn't change correct outcomes). A risk-limiting audit has a known chance of correcting the reported outcome if the reported outcome is wrong (and doesn't change correct outcomes).

Risk limit: largest possible chance of *not* correcting reported outcome, if reported outcome is wrong.

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- Routine in CO and soon RI; pilots in 9 states and Denmark
- laws in TX, VA, CA?

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- what if they malfunction?

- research so far:
 - few voters check
 - checks so brief unlikely to help
 - voters can't remember selections

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- if pollworker convinced, what recourse is there?
 - new election? (no way to find correct outcome)
 - "wolf!"

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- If LEO has evidence that the outcome is still correct, should be able to prove it to public*

(*Without compromising the anonymity of votes.)

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Current BMDs can be hacked undetectably and alter outcomes: not *software independent*.

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- Risk-limiting audit

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5 Cs

- Create durable, trustworthy record of voter intent
 - ideally, hand-marked paper ballots + BMDs for voters who benefit from them
- Care for the paper record
 - verifiable chain of custody, 2-person custody rules, ballot accounting, good seal protocols, etc.
- Compliance audit: establish whether paper trail is trustworthy
 - ballot accounting including VRDB, pollbooks, etc.; check chain of custody logs, video, etc.; eligibility
- Check reported outcome against the paper by auditing
- Correct the reported outcome if it is wrong