


Social Choice and Social Networks

Bayesian Martingale Models

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The Bayesian View of the Jury Theorem

- Recall: we assume +/- with prior probability (0.5,0.5).
- Each voter receives signal x_i which is correct with probability p independently.
- Note that if this is indeed the case, then after the vote has been cast, all voters can calculate:
 - $P[s = + \mid x] / P[s = - \mid x]$.
- Obtain posterior probability of +, -.
- Everybody agree about the posterior.

Critique of The Bayesian View

- The main critique is:
- In real elections people don't all converge to the same posterior!
- The common prior assumption is obviously violated
- However, the Bayesian setup may still be useful:

Usefulness of the Bayesian View

- However, the Bayesian setup is still useful:
- Since it has nice theory.
- It allows to compare different networks, modes of communication etc.
- Allows to test in what way people deviate from “rational behavior”
- Perhaps more applicable to learning: ask people to predict outcome of elections
- Perhaps more applicable to computational agents.

Challenges in The Bayesian View

- In Condorcet Jury Theorem - the theory was easy.
- Why?
-

Challenges in The Bayesian View

- In Condorcet Jury Theorem - the theory was easy.
- In general: the theory is easy if every agent can see the information of all other agents at some finite time.
- Theory is more interesting if only partial information is revealed. Examples:
 - Each player only says how much she believes in something and not why.
 - You only see some of the agents and not all.

A few examples of Bayesian Analysis

- In the first family of examples the goal is to evaluate the expected value of some function (prob. of some event).
- 2 players - agreeing to disagree (Aumann 1976)
- General directed graph (Parikh Krasucki 90s)
- Gaussian signals (P. DeMarzo, D. Vayanos, and J. Zwiebel , M+Tamuz)
- In the 2nd family of examples the actions of players are very limited (binary) while the signal space is very rich (continuous).
- Voting on social networks (Gale Kariv 2003)
- The complete graph case (M + Tamuz)

Aumann's example

- Two agents have a complete common prior.
- Agent $i=1,2$ initially receives signal $s(i)$.
- There is a bounded function f from the space to \mathbb{R} say.
- Then for each time t :
 - Agent 1 declares $f(2t) = E[f \mid s(1), f(1), \dots, f(2t-1)]$
 - Agent 2 declares $f(2t+1) = E[f \mid s(2), f(1), \dots, f(2t)]$
- Th (Aumann 76, Geanakoplos & Polemarchakis 82)
- The sequence $f(t)$ converges almost surely.

- Interpretation: let f be the indicator of some event.
- By repeatedly announcing their beliefs of the event the two agents will converge to the same posterior probability.
-
- Examples: Biased dice and samples.

Aumann's example

- Agent 1 declares $f(2t) = E[f \mid s(1), f(1), \dots, f(2t-1)]$
- Agent 2 declares $f(2t+1) = E[f \mid s(2), f(1), \dots, f(2t)]$
- Th (Aumann 76, Geanakoplos & Polemarchakis 82)
- The sequence $f(t)$ converges almost surely.

- Proof idea

- Let $F(t)$ denote the sigma algebra generated by the functions $\{f(1), \dots, f(t)\}$.
- Then $E[f \mid F(t)]$, $t \geq 0$ is bounded martingale = view from the outside.
- Moreover: $f(t) = E[f \mid F(t)]$ a.s.

- Comment: Note that the same argument applies to
- n agents as well.

A generalization to directed graphs

- We now consider the same story but with n agents on a directed graph G :
- At time t each vertex v declares its expected value of f conditioned on its signal and what it has seen up to time t :
 - $f(v,t) := E[f \mid s(v), f(w,s), w \in N(v), 1 \leq s \leq t-1]$
 - Directed/Undirected \leftrightarrow Phone vs. Email.
 - Social Network aspect.
 - Assume social network is known.
- Example: interval of length 3 and dice.
- Q: Do $f(v,t)$ all converge to the same value?

A generalization to directed graphs

- Q: Is it the case that $f(v,t)$ all converge to the same value?
- Obviously not:
- If there are two connected components they will not converge to the same value.
- In fact the graph $u \rightarrow v$ also does not converge.
-

A generalization to directed graphs

- Q: Is it the case that $f(v,t)$ all converge to the same value?
- Obviously not:
 - If there are two connected components they will not converge to the same value.
 - In fact the graph $u \rightarrow v$ would also not converge.
- Thm (Parikh, Krasucki):
 - In the graph G is strongly connected, all agents will a.s. converge to the same value.
- Recall: Strongly connected means that for every pair of vertices there is a directed path connecting them.

A generalization to directed graphs

Proof Sketch: :

- Let $F(v,t)$ be generated by $\{f(v,s) : s \leq t\}$ and conclude that $f(v,t)$ converges to $f(v) = E[f \mid F(v)]$, $F(v) = \{f(v,s)\}$
- $f(v)$ is the function closest in $L^2(F(v))$ to f .
- Next we do the same with $F'(v,t)$ generated by
- $\{f(v,s) : s \leq t\} \cup \{f(w,s) : s < t : w \in N(v)\}$
- Again we get that $f(v,t)$ converges to $f(v) = E[f \mid F'(v)]$
- Implies that if $v \rightarrow w$ in G then $\|f(v) - f\|_2 \leq \|f(w) - f\|_2$.
- Strongly connectivity $\Rightarrow \forall u,v: \|f(v) - f\|_2 = \|f(w) - f\|_2$
- If $v \rightarrow w$ and $f(v) \neq f(w)$ then $g = 0.5(f(v) + f(w)) \in F'(v)$ and g closer to f than either $f(v)$ or $f(w)$.
- Strongly connectivity $\Rightarrow \forall u,v: f(v) = f(w)$.

Some Things we do know about the model

- Players do not have to converge to the correct posterior.
- Example (Greg): prior $(0.5, 0.5)$ two players are given uniformly at random two bits whose e-xor is the state.
- For a finite state space: # of steps to convergence is at most # of sigma-algebras on the state.
- Pf: (Geanakoplos & Polemarchakis; Joe):
- When the two sigma-algebras remain the same for both players this will remain like that forever.
- More in GP: Examples where for n steps nothing happens and then converge to the same opinion.

Some Things we do know about the model

- Example: State space $[n^2]$ with uniform prior.
- Player 1 observes groups $\{1\dots,n\},\{n+1,\dots,2n\}$ etc.
- Player 2 observes groups $\{1,\dots,n+1\},\dots, n^2\}$
- True value is 1.
- The event is $\{1,n+2,2n+3,\dots, n^2\}$.

- What will happen?
- Player 1 will say $1/n$
- Player 2 will say $1/(n+1)$
- Player 1 learns that it is not n^2 but will still say $1/n$.
- Player 2 learns that player 1 was not in the last group but will still say $1/(n+1)$.
- etc.

Many things we do not know about this model

Many things we do not know about this model

- We do not know how long it takes to converge.
- We do not if it converges to a “good answer”.
- What is the computational complexity of the Bayesian process?
- It is known that if the original space is finite convergence will hold after finitely many steps.


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Some aspects of the Bayesian approach

- We do not know how long it takes to converge.
 - We do not if it converges to a “good answer”.
 - What is the computational complexity of the Bayesian process?
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- Some partial answers are known.
-
- We will talk about a Gaussian model which is:
 - Computationally feasible
 - Has rapid convergence.
 - Converges to the optimal answer for every connected network.
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- Following model was studied in P. DeMarzo, D. Vayanos, and J. Zwiebel. and by Mossel and Tamuz.


The Gaussian Model

- The original signals are $N(\mu = ?, 1)$.
- In each iteration
 - Each agent action reveals her current estimate of μ to her neighbors.
 - E.g. set price by min utility $(x - \mu)^2$
 - Each agent calculates a new estimate of μ based on her neighbors' broadcasts.
- Assume agents know the graph structure.
- Repeat *ad infinitum*
- Assume agents know the graph structure.
- Example: interval of length 4.




Utopia

- “Network Learns” $\text{Avg}(X_v)$
- Variance of this estimator is $1/n$.
- Could be achieved if everyone was friends with everyone.
- Technical comments: This is both the
- ML estimator &
- Bayesian estimator with uniform prior on $(-\infty, \infty)$




Results

- For every connected network:
- The best estimator is reached within n^2 rounds where $n = \#nodes$ (DVZ & MT)
- Convergence time can be improved to $2 * n * \text{diameter}$ (MT)
- All computations are efficient (MT)




Pf: ML and Min Variance.

- Claim 1: At each iteration
 $X_v(t)$ = Bayes Estimator
= Maximum Like estimator
- Moreover, $X_v(t) \in L_v(t)$, where
 $L_v(t) = \text{span} \{ X_w(0), \dots, X_w(t-1) : w \sim v \}$
- $X_v(t)$ is argmin of
 $\{ \text{Var}(X) : X \in L_v(t), E[X] = \mu \}$
- Claim: Can be calculated efficiently



Pf: ML and Min Variance.

- Cor: $\text{Var}(X_v(t))$ decreases with time
- Note: If $X_v(t) \neq X_u(t)$, dim of either L_v or L_u goes up by 1 ($v \sim u$)
- \Rightarrow Converges in n^2 rounds.
- Claim: Weight that agent gives own estimator has to be at least $1/n$ (prove it!)
- \Rightarrow converges to optimal estimator



Convergence in $2n \cdot d$ steps

• Claim: If an agent u estimator X remains for $2 \cdot d$ steps $t, t+1, \dots, t+2d$ then the process has converged.

• Pf:

• Let $L = L_u(t+2d)$

• Let v be a neighbor of u .

• $X_{t+1}(v), \dots, X_{t+2d-1}(v) \in L$.

• $X \in L_v(t+1)$

• So $X_{t+1}(v) = \dots = X_{t+2d-1}(v) = X$

• If w is a neighbor of u then:

• $X_{t+2}(w) = \dots = X_{t+2d-2}(w) = X$

• By induction at time $t+d$ all estimators are X .

Truncated information

- Why could we analyze the cases so far?
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- A main feature was that agents declarations were martingales.
- A more difficult case is where agents declarations are more limited.
- Example: +/- actions / declarations.
- This will be discussed next week.