Gambling under unknown probabilities as a proxy for real world decisions under uncertainty

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• Background: “Probability in the Real World” course and web site.
• An Inconvenient Truth: for most interesting future real world events, we don’t know a numerical probability.
• In a few contexts – finance and sports – we have much data and useful models to estimate probabilities.
• Is there any mathematics relevant to unique future events [slide 5] where we only have “perceived probabilities” (from individuals or groups or algorithms or . . . . . . ).

Yes – more than you might expect. That’s the take-home message of our basic example.

• We focus on going from vague questions in words to toy mathematical models. Analysis of the models is mostly very elementary – high school algebra and a basic college course in probability – the slides just show the conclusions. We focus on the conceptual background which is more sophisticated.

[Ongoing joint work with F. Thomas Bruss. There is a draft paper on my web site.]
Conceptual aside

Many people implicitly believe both assertions below.

- In the June 13 International Football match between Netherlands and Ukraine, there is no “true probability” that Netherlands will win.
- Over many bets (e.g. on different football matches), a gambler who is more accurate at assessing probabilities will do better than a gambler who is less accurate.

Writing this explicitly reveals an inconsistency – do you believe in “true probability”, or not?

I adopt the “naive” philosophy that any future event has some unknown true probability. There is solid scientific data that is difficult to explain within alternate philosophies.
Part 1: the basic example

This basic example can be expressed via two different (mathematically equivalent) stories:

- (first): A prediction tournament
- (later): A Gentleman’s Bet.

The first context is more concrete, with substantial experimental data. The advantage of the second is that it suggests many extensions, for Part 2.
In a *prediction tournament*, contestants state probabilities of future geopolitical events. Here are some questions asked currently on gjopen.com.

Before 1 October 2021:

- Will Boris Johnson cease to be prime minister of the United Kingdom?
- Will China officially declare an air-defense identification zone over any part of the South China Sea?
- Will the U.S. leveraged loan default rate exceed 5.0%?
- Will Saudi Arabia diplomatically recognize the State of Israel?
- Will the UN declare that a famine exists in any part of Yemen?
- Will Russia conduct a flight test of an RS-28 Sarmat ICBM?

[xxx make prediction on gjopen]
How can we assess someone’s ability? We do what Gauss said 200 years ago – use mean square error MSE. An event is a 0 - 1 variable; if we predict 70% probability then our score on that question is the “squared error”:

(if event happens) $(1.0 - 0.70)^2 = 0.09$
(if event doesn’t happen) $(0.0 - 0.70)^2 = 0.49$

Your tournament score is the sum of scores on each question. As in golf one seeks a low score. Also as in golf, in a tournament all contestants address the same questions; it is not a single-elimination tournament as in tennis.
Write $S$ for your “tournament score” when the true probabilities of the $n$ events are $(p_i, 1 \leq i \leq n)$ and you predict $(q_i, 1 \leq i \leq n)$.

- Your **actual** score depends on the $(q_i)$ and the event outcomes.
- Your **expected** score depends on the $(q_i)$ and the $(p_i)$.

A short calculation shows

$$\mathbb{E}S = \sum_i p_i(1 - p_i) + n\sigma^2$$

where

$$\sigma^2 := n^{-1} \sum_i (q_i - p_i)^2$$

$\sigma^2$ is your MSE (mean squared error) in assessing the probabilities.

So for contestants A and B

$$n^{-1}\mathbb{E}(S_A - S_B) = \sigma_A^2 - \sigma_B^2$$

and so **in the long run** we can tell who is the more accurate forecaster **without knowing true probabilities**.
Extensive data, e.g. from IARPA-sponsored prediction tournaments over 2013-2017, shows that some individuals consistently get better scores than others. The natural interpretation is that some individuals are better than others at assessing true probabilities.

What about the short run? The IARPA tournaments had around 100 questions. Under a somewhat realistic model, here are the chances of a more accurate forecaster beating a less accurate forecaster in a 100-question tournament.

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<th>RMS error (less accurate)</th>
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<th>0.1</th>
<th>0.15</th>
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<td>(more accurate)</td>
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A gentleman’s bet: hypothetical example

You think a future event has probability 20%, your friend thinks it has probability 30%, so you make a bet at odds corresponding to 25%. For instance

- you would pay your friend $15 if event did happen
- your friend would pay you $5 if event did not happen.

Each person perceives the bet as favorable.

Gambling odds can be presented in many ways. As in prediction markets (next), we work in term of contracts, where one contract on an event will pay $1 if the event occurs, or $0 if not. In this format

You sell 20 contracts to your friend at price 25 (cents) per contract.

[xxx Do real example on predictit]
A gentleman’s bet: analysis

- Sequence of $n$ future events (arbitrary, unrelated or related).
- Gamblers A and B perceive event $i$ as having probability $q_i^A$ and $q_i^B$.
- Bet (on event $i$) at odds corresponding to probability $r_i = (q_i^A + q_i^B)/2$.
- Size of bet (number of contracts) proportional to difference $q_i^A - q_i^B$.

In our format

\[ A \text{ buys } \kappa(q_i^A - q_i^B) \text{ contracts from } B \text{ at price } r_i \text{ per contract}. \]

Here $\kappa$ is the constant of proportionality – how much money the individual is inclined to gamble with.

Suppose A and B are competing in a prediction tournament (for points) but also betting (for money as above) on each event. Then regardless of outcome, on each event

\[ \text{money gain to A from B} = 2\kappa \text{ (score of B - score of A)}. \]

So the two contexts are mathematically equivalent. But note the specific protocol for gambling.
So our result for prediction tournaments translates to the gambling context: over \( n \) bets on different events

\[
n^{-1} \mathbb{E}(\text{money gain to A from B}) = 2\kappa(\sigma_B^2 - \sigma_A^2)
\]

where for each gambler, \( \sigma \) is the RMS error in their probability assessments \( q_i \):

\[
\sigma^2 := n^{-1} \sum_i (q_i - p_i)^2.
\]

This is true regardless of the unknown true probabilities \( (p_i) \).

In a prediction market, the market price represents a consensus probability. If you follow this protocol with real money in the market, then your long run gain/loss tells you precisely how much better/worse your probability estimates are, compared with the market consensus.
Part 1: conclusion.

There are real-world activities in which one can estimate relative abilities at estimating probabilities of real-world events.

However . . . . . . . . . Prediction tournaments and prediction markets are very special, so maybe not clear how these results might relate to broader “decisions under uncertainty” where probabilities are unknown. In contrast, gambling is a very general activity.

Part 2: explore the general idea

In any activity that can be interpreted as of gambling, those agents who are more accurate at estimating probabilities will be more successful than those agents who are less accurate.

Here we will discuss “toy models”, not intended to accurately reflect real world activity for which we have real data. The bad news is that the “true probabilities don’t matter” property does not extend very far.
In the draft paper we discuss the 5 examples below; today I’ll describe 2 of them.

- **The bookmakers dilemma**: A bookmaker offers odds corresponding to different event probabilities, say 64% and 60%, for an event happening or not happening. How to choose these values, based on the bookmakers and the gamblers’ perceptions of the probability?

- **Bet I’m better than you!**: Two opponents in a game of skill may choose to bet at even odds, but only do so if each believes they are more skillful than the other.

- **Kelly rules**: Adapting to our setting the Kelly criterion for allocating sizes of favorable bets.

The models above fit into the basic setting where the only unknown quantity is the probability of a given event. The following models have more elaborate settings of “unknowns”.

- **Pistols at dawn**: When to fire your one shot, if uncertain about abilities.

- **Unknown consequences of actions**: Unknown mean utilities when choosing or bidding.
General framework

- Make a toy model of a situation where one has to make an action (like deciding whether and how much to bet) whose outcome (gain/loss of money/utility) depends on whether an event of probability $p_{true}$ occurs.

- There is some known optimal (maximize expected utility) action if $p_{true}$ is known.

- But all one has is a “perceived” probability $p_{perc}$.

- So one just takes the action that one would take if $p_{perc}$ were the true probability.

- Now we study the consequences of the action under the assumption that $p_{perc} = p_{true} + \xi$ for random error $\xi$, where (for analysis) we usually will assume that $\xi$ has mean zero.
The bookmakers dilemma

A bookmaker offers odds corresponding to different event probabilities, say 64% and 60%, for an event happening or not happening. Here [60, 64] is the bookmaker’s spread. How to choose these values, based on the bookmakers and the gamblers’ perceptions of the probability?

We study some very over-simplified models, to see if the qualitative behavior seems reasonable.
Model 1: Suppose

- The bookmaker knows the true probability: $p_{book} = p_{true}$.
- Gamblers have different perceived probabilities, say uniform on some interval $[p_{gamb} - L, p_{gamb} + L]$ which is known to the bookmaker.
- The bookmaker offers bets as a spread $[x_1, x_2]$ of contract prices.
- An individual gambler with perceived probability $p_{perc} > x_2$ will buy $\kappa(p_{perc} - x_2)$ contracts at price $x_2$, and conversely an individual gambler with perceived probability $p_{perc} < x_1$ will sell $\kappa(x_2 - p_{perc})$ contracts at price $x_1$. Other gamblers do not bet.

In this model, the bookmaker can optimize over $x_1$ and $x_2$. Here are the results.
The optimal spread interval is

\[ [x_1, x_2] = \left[ \frac{2}{3} p_{\text{true}} + \frac{1}{3} (p_{\text{gamb}} - L), \frac{2}{3} p_{\text{true}} + \frac{1}{3} (p_{\text{gamb}} + L) \right] \]  

and the resulting profit is

\[ \mathbb{E}[ \text{mean gain to bookmaker} ] = \frac{2\kappa}{27} (L^2 + 3\Delta^2); \]
\[ \Delta := p_{\text{gamb}} - p_{\text{true}}. \]  

Recall gambler’s perceived probabilities are uniform on the interval 
\[ [p_{\text{gamb}} - L, p_{\text{gamb}} + L]. \]

**Comments:** (a) The bookmaker benefits from the gamblers’ “bias” \( \Delta \) and from the gamblers’ spread of perceived probabilities \( L \).  
(b) The bookmaker’s spread is not centered on \( p_{\text{true}} \) or on \( p_{\text{gamb}} \) but on a weighted average.

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**Politics**

**How Offshore Oddsmakers Made a Killing off Gullible Trump Supporters**

The emotions and strategies behind record-setting bets on a MAGA victory that never came.
Model 2: Now suppose the gambler population is unbiased, in the sense that perceived probabilities are uniform on \([p_{\text{true}} - L, p_{\text{true}} + L]\). But the bookmaker does not know the true probability, but has a perceived probability \(p_{\text{book}} = p_{\text{true}} + \xi\) where the error \(\xi\) has a symmetric distribution with variance \(\sigma^2\). By calculation

The bookmaker’s optimal spread interval is symmetric about \(p_{\text{book}}\) and

\[
\mathbb{E}[ \text{mean gain to bookmaker} ] = \kappa h(\sigma^2/L^2)L^2
\]

for a function \(h\) shown in the figure.

Note the gain depends on the ratio \(\sigma/L\) of error sizes of bookmaker and individual gambler – providing an illustration of the \textbf{general theme} that size of errors in perceived probabilities directly affects outcomes.
Consider your stock portfolio.
- For each $1 in stock $i$, after 1 year it will be worth $X_i$, random.
- Portfolio: invest proportion $q_i \geq 0$ of your money in each stock $i$.
- So after 1 year your initial fortune is multiplied by $M := \sum_i q_i X_i$.
- The **Kelly optimal** choice of $(q_i)$ is to maximize $\mathbb{E} \log(M)$.

This assumes you know the correct (joint) probability distribution of $(X_i, i \geq 1)$. But no-one does. This fits our “unknown probabilities” setting.

Any realistic analysis would be very complicated. Here is a toy model. Imagine a simple hypothetical setting of betting at **even odds**, on events with probability close to 0.5. If we bet a small proportion $a$ of our fortune and the event occurs with probability $0.5 + \delta$ for small $\delta > 0$ then to first order

$$\text{growth rate} = 2a\delta - a^2/2. \quad (4)$$

So for known $\delta > 0$
- the optimal choice of proportion is $a = 2\delta$
- the resulting optimal growth rate is $2\delta^2$.

Formula (4) remains true for small $\delta < 0$ but of course here the optimal choice is $a = 0$. 

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Gambling under unknown probabilities as a proxy for real world decisions under uncertainty
In our context there is a perceived probability $0.5 + \delta_{perc}$ and we make the optimal choice based on the perceived probability, that is to bet a proportion $a = \max(0, 2\delta_{perc})$. We use our usual model for perceived probabilities

$$\delta_{perc} = \delta_{true} + \xi.$$  

The growth rate $2a\delta_{true} - a^2/2$ can be rewritten as

$$\text{growth rate} = 2(\delta_{true}^2 - \xi^2) \quad \text{if } \xi > -\delta_{true}$$

$$= 0 \quad \text{else}.$$  

Now assume that $\xi$ has Normal$(0, \sigma^2)$ distribution. We can evaluate the expectation of the growth rate in terms of the pdf $\phi$ and the cdf $\Phi$ of the standard Normal $Z$. For $\delta := \delta_{true}$,

$$E[\text{growth rate}] = 2E[(\delta^2 - \sigma^2Z^2)1(\sigma Z > -\delta)]$$

$$= 2(\delta^2 \Phi(\delta/\sigma) - \sigma^2 S(-\delta/\sigma))$$

where

$$S(y) := E[Z^2 1(Z > y)] = y\phi(y) + \Phi(-y).$$

Putting this together,

$$E[\text{growth rate}] = 2(\delta_{true}^2 - \sigma^2)\Phi(\delta_{true}/\sigma) + 2\sigma\delta_{true}\phi(\delta_{true}/\sigma). \quad (5)$$
The Figure shows the growth rate as a function of $\delta := \delta_{\text{true}}$ for several values of $\sigma$. It confirms simple intuition: roughly

*if your perceived probabilities have typical error 10% ($\sigma = 0.1$) then you will only make money in the long run if your win probabilities are typically at least 0.6 ($\delta \geq 0.5 + \sigma$).*

This Kelly setting suggests the general **allowance problem**: could agents do better if they knew the typical accuracy of their perceived probabilities and adjusted their actions?"
General framework

- Make a toy model of a situation where one has to make an action (like deciding whether and how much to bet) whose outcome (gain/loss of money/utility) depends on whether an event of probability $p_{true}$ occurs.

- There is some known optimal (maximize expected utility) action if $p_{true}$ is known.

- But all one has is a “perceived” probability $p_{perc}$.

- **So one just takes the action that one would take if $p_{perc}$ were the true probability.**

- Now we study the consequences of the action under the assumption that $p_{perc} = p_{true} + \xi$ for random error $\xi$, where usually we need to assume that $\xi$ has mean zero.

Knowing that your perceived probabilities are inaccurate suggests (intuitively) that one should gamble more conservatively (risk less money). As a first “serious math theory” question: is this true in the Kelly model above?
Conclusion

- Project started as material for one lecture in my undergraduate course.
- Some relevant technical literature, for instance on the topic of combining expert assessments.
- Draft paper on my web site.
- Curious that the general framework has apparently not been developed; it seems a natural first step in making classical decision theory more realistic.
- Comments welcome!