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# Talk Plan

- Probability and Gaussian Geometry:
  - Non linear invariance for low influence functions
  - Gaussian Geometry and "Majority is Stablest".

- Quantitative Social choice
  Qauntitative Arrow theorem.
- Approximate Optimization
  - Unique Games and hardness of Max-Cut
  - General Optimization
- More on Gaussian Geometry.

# Lindeberg & Berry Esseen

- Let  $X_i = +1/-1$  w.p  $\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $N_i \sim N(0,1)$  ind.
- $f(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} c_i x_i$  with  $\sum c_i^2 = 1$ .
- <u>Thm: (Berry Esseen CLT):</u>
- $sup_{+} |P[f(X) \le t] P[f(N) \le t]| \le 3 \max |c_{i}|$
- Note that  $f(N) = f(N_1,...,N_n) \sim N(0,1)$ .
- Lindeberg pf idea: can replace X<sub>i</sub> with N<sub>i</sub> "one at a time" as long as all coefficients are small.
- <u>Q</u>: can this be done for other functions f?
   e.g. multi-linear polynomials?



# Some Examples

• Q: Is it possible to apply Lindeberg principle to other functions f with small coefficients to show that  $f(X) \sim f(N)$ ?

- $E \times 1$ :  $f(x) = (n^{3}/6)^{-1/2} \sum_{i < j < k} x_{i} x_{j} x_{k}$
- $\rightarrow$  Okay: Limit is N<sup>3</sup> 3N

- <u>Ex 2</u>:  $f(x) = (2n)^{-1/2} (x_1 x_2) (x_1 + .... + x_n)$
- $\rightarrow$  Not OK
- For X:  $P[f(X) = 0] \ge \frac{1}{2}$ .

# **Invariance** Principle

- <u>Thm (MOO := M-O' Donnell-</u> <u>Oleszkiewicz):</u>
- Let  $f(x) = \sum_{s} c_{s} X_{s}$  be a multi-linear of degree k with  $\sum c_{s^{2}} = 1 (X_{s} = \prod_{i \in s} x_{i})$
- $I_i(f) := \sum_{S:i \in S} c_S^2 \cdot \delta(f) = \max_i I_i(f)$



- Then:
- $\sup_{t} |P[f(X) \le t] P[f(N) \le t]| \le 3 k \delta^{1/8d}$
- Works if X has 2+e moments + other setups.



# The Role of Hyper-Contraction

- <u>Pf Ideas:</u>
- Lindeberg trick (replace one variable at a time)
- Hyper-contraction allows to bound high moments in term of lower ones.
- <u>Key fact</u>: A degree d polynomial S of hyp. contract. variables satisfies  $||S||_q \leq C(q)^d ||S||_2$

#### An Invariance Principle

- <u>Invariance Principle [M+O'Donnell+Oleszkiewicz(05)]</u>:
- Let  $p(x) = \sum_{0 \le |S| \le k} a_S \prod_{i \in S} x_i$  be a degree k multilinear polynomial with  $|p|_2 = 1$  and  $I_i(p) \le \delta$  for all i.
- Let X = (X<sub>1</sub>,...,X<sub>n</sub>) be i.i.d. P[X<sub>i</sub> = ± 1] = 1/2.
   N = (N<sub>1</sub>,...,N<sub>n</sub>) be i.i.d. Normal(0,1).
- Then for all †:  $|P[p(X) \le t] - P[p(N) \le t]| \le O(k \delta^{1/(4k)})$ (Proof works for any hyper-contractive random vars).

#### Invariance Principle - Proof Sketch

• Suffices to show that  $\forall$  smooth F (sup  $|F^{(4)}| \leq C$ ), E[F(p(X<sub>1</sub>,...,X<sub>n</sub>)] is close to E[F(p(N<sub>1</sub>,...,N<sub>n</sub>))].

# Main Lemma. $\begin{aligned} &|\mathbf{E}[F(p(X_1,\ldots,X_{i-1},N_i,N_{i+1}\ldots,N_n)] - \\ &|\mathbf{E}[F(p(X_1,\ldots,X_{i-1},X_i,N_{i+1},\ldots,N_n)]| &\leq C9^k I_i^2 \leq C9^k \delta I_i. \end{aligned}$ Therefore

 $|\mathbf{E}[F(p(X_1,\ldots,X_n)] - \mathbf{E}[F(p(N_1,\ldots,N_n)]| \leq C9^k \delta \sum_i I_i \leq Ck9^k \delta.$ 

#### Invariance Principle - Proof Sketch

- Write:  $p(X_{1},...,X_{i-1}, N_{i}, N_{i+1},...,N_{n}) = R + N_{i} S$ 
  - $p(X_{1},...,X_{i-1},X_{i},N_{i+1},...,N_{n}) = R + X_{i} S$
- $F(R+N_i S) = F(R) + F'(R) S N_i + F''(R) (S^2/2) N_i^2 +$  $F^{(3)}(R) (S^{3}/6) N_{i}^{3} + F^{(4)}(*) N_{i}^{4} S^{4}/24$
- $E[F(R+N_i S)] = E[F(R)] + E[F''(R) S^2] / 2 + E[F^{(4)}(*)N_i^4 S^4] / 24$
- $E[F(R + X_i S)] = E[F(R)] + E[F''(R) S^2] / 2 + E[F^{(4)}(*)X_i^4 S^4] / 24$

- $|E[F(R + N_i S) E[F(R + X_i S)]| \le C E[S^4]$

• But,  $E[S^2] = I_i(p)$ .

• And by Hyper-Contractivity,  $E[S^4] \le 9^{k-1} E[S^2]^2$ 

• So:  $|E[F(R + N_i S) - E[F(R + X_i S)] \le C 9^k I_i^2$ 

 $\bigcirc$ 

#### A direct proof of $E[S^4] \le 9^{k-1} E[S^2]$

- Assuming:  $E[X_i] = E[X_i^3] = 0$ ,  $E[X_i^2] = 1$ ,  $E[X_i^4] \le 9$ . Note: deg(S) = k-1.
- Pf by induction on number of variables.
- Write S = R +  $X_n$  T so deg(T)  $\leq$  k-2.

Induction

- $E[S^4] = E[R^4] + 6 E[R^2 T^2] + E[X_n^4] E[T^4]$ 
  - $\leq E[R^4] + 6 E[R^2 T^2] + 9 E[T^4]$ 
    - $\leq (E[R^4]^{1/2} + 3 E[T^4]^{1/2})^2$ 
      - $\leq (3^{k-1} E[R^2] + 3^* 3^{k-2} E[T^2])^2$
      - $= 9^{k-1} (E[R^2] + E[T^2])^2 = 9^{k-1} E[S^2]^2$

# **Related Work**

- Many works generalizing Lindeberg ideaa.
- <u>Rotar 79</u>: Similar but no hyper-contraction, Berry-Esseen.
- Classical results for U,V statistics.
- M (FOCS 08, Geom. and Functional Analysis 10):
- Multi-function versions.
- General "noise".
- Bounds in terms of cross influences.
- Motivation: Proving "Majority is Stablest".

# Majority is Stablest

- Let  $(X_i, Y_i) \in \{-1, 1\}^2$  &  $E[X_i] = E[Y_i] = 0$ ;  $E[X_i Y_i] = \rho$ .
- Let  $Maj(x) = sgn(\sum x_i)$ .
- <u>Thm (Sheffield 1899)</u>:
- E[Maj(X) Maj(Y)]  $\rightarrow$  M( $\rho$ ) := (2 arcsin  $\rho$ )/ $\pi$
- <u>Pf Idea:</u>
- Let N,M ~ N(0,1) jointly Gaussian with E[N M] =  $\rho$ .
- Then:
- $\lim E[Maj(X) Maj(Y)] = E[sgn(N) sgn(M)] = M(\rho)$

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- E[Maj(X) Maj(Y)]  $\rightarrow$  M( $\rho$ ) := (2 arcsin  $\rho$ )/ $\pi$
- <u>Thm (Borell, 1985)</u>:
- Let N,M be two n-dim normal vectors
- where  $(N_i, M_i)$  i.i.d. &  $E[N_i] = E[N_i] = 0$ ;  $E[N_i M_i] = \rho$ .
- Let  $f : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow [-1,1]$  with  $\mathbb{E}[f] = 0$ .
- Then:  $E[f(N) f(M)] \le E[sgn(N_1) sgn(M_1)] = M(\rho)$

# Majority is Stablest

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- Let  $Maj(x) = sgn(\sum x_i)$ .
- <u>Thm (Sheffield 1899)</u>:
- E[Maj(X) Maj(Y)]  $\rightarrow$  M( $\rho$ ) := (2 arcsin  $\rho$ )/ $\pi$
- Thm (MOO; "Majority is Stablest"):
- Let  $f: \{-1,1\}^n \to [-1,1]$  with E[f] = 0.
- $I_i(f) := P[f(X_1,...,X_i,...,X_n) \neq f(X_1,...,X_n)]$
- $I = \max I_i(f)$
- Then:  $E[f(X) f(Y)] \le M(\rho) + C/log^2(1/l)$

# Majority is Stablest - Pf Idea

• <u>Pf Sketch:</u>

• E[f(X) f(Y)] = E[g(X') g(Y')] where • g = T<sub>n</sub> f, X' and Y' are  $\eta$  correlated and  $\rho = \eta'^2 \eta$ 

• g is essentially a low-degree function.

- Since g is of low influence and "low degree":
- $E[g(X) g(Y)] \sim E[g(N) g(M)] \leq M(\rho)$

# Majority is Stablest - Context

- Conext:
- Conjectured by Kalai in 2002 as it implies majority minimized Arrow paradox in a class of functions.
- Proves the conjecture of Khot-Kindler-M-O' Donnell
   2005 in the context of approximate optimization.
- More general versions proved in M-10
- M-10 allows truncation in general "noise" structure.
- <u>E.g: In M-10: Majority is most predictable</u>:
- Among low influence functions majority outcome is most predictable give a random sample of inputs<sup>16</sup>

#### Quantitative Social Choice

- Quantitative social choice studies different voting methods in a quantitative way.
- Standard assumption is of uniform voting probability.
- A "stress-test" distribution.
- Renewed interest in the context of computational agents.
- Consider general voting rule
  - $f: \{-1,1\}^n \rightarrow \{-1,1\} \text{ or } f: [q]^n \rightarrow [q] \text{ etc.}$





#### Errors in Voting

- <u>Majority is Stablest in voting language:</u>
- Majority minimizes probability of error in outcome among low influence functions.
- <u>Plurality is Stablest (IM) 11:</u>
- Plurality minimizes probability of error in outcome among low influence functions (this is equivalent to the Peace-Sign conjecture)







#### <u>Errors in Voting</u>

- <u>Majority is Most Predictable (M 08; 10)</u>:
- Suppose each voter is in a poll with prob. p independently.
- Majority is most predictable from poll among all low influence functions.
- <u>Next Example Arrow theorem</u>
- Fundamental theorem of modern social choice.







## Condorcet Paradox

- n voters are to choose between 3 options / candidates.
- Voter i ranks the three candidates A, B & C via a permutation  $\sigma_i \in S_3$
- Let  $X^{AB}_{i} = +1$  if  $\sigma_i(A) > \sigma_i(B)$  $X^{AB}_{i} = -1$  if  $\sigma_i(B) > \sigma_i(A)$
- Aggregate rankings via: f,g,h :  $\{-1,1\}^n \rightarrow \{-1,1\}$ .
- Thus: A is preferred over B if  $f(x^{AB}) = 1$ .
- A Condorcet Paradox occurs ("f irrational") if:  $f(x^{AB}) = g(x^{BC}) = h(x^{CA}).$
- Defined by Marquis de Condorcet in 18' th century.





## Arrow's Impossibility Thm

• <u>Thm (Condorecet)</u>: If n > 2 and f is the majority function then there exists rankings  $\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n$  resulting in a Paradox

- <u>Thm</u> (Arrow's Impossibility): For all n > 1, unless f is the dictator function, there exist rankings  $\sigma_1,...,\sigma_n$  resulting in a paradox.
- Arrow received the Nobel prize (72)



#### <u>Probability of a Paradox</u>

- What is the probability of a paradox:
- $PDX(f) = P[f(x^{AB}) = f(x^{BC}) = f(x^{CA})]?$
- <u>Arrow's</u>: f = dictator iff PDX(f) = 0.



- <u>Thm</u>(Kalai 02): Majority is Stablest for p=1/3→ majority minimizes probability of paradox among low influences functions (7-8%).
- <u>Thm</u>(Isacsson-M 11): Majority maximizes probability of a unique winner for any number of alternatives.
- (Proof uses invariance + Exchangble Gaussian Theorem)

#### Probability of a Paradox

- <u>Thm</u>(Kalai 02): Majority is Stablest for ρ=1/3→ majority minimizes probability of paradox among low influences functions (7-8%).
- <u>Pf Sketch:</u>
- $PDX(f) = \frac{1}{4} (1 + E[f(x^{AB}) f(x^{BC}) + f(x^{BC}) f(x^{CA}) + f(x^{CA}) f(x^{AB})])$
- $|E[f(x^{AB}) f(x^{BC})]| = |E[f(x^{AB}) f^{-}(-x^{BC})]| = |E[f T_{1/3} f^{-}]|$
- $\cdot \ \leq \mathsf{E}[\mathsf{f} \ \mathsf{T}_{1/3} \ \mathsf{f}]^{1/2} \ \mathsf{E}[\mathsf{f}^{-} \ \mathsf{T}_{1/3} \ \mathsf{f}^{-}]^{1/2} \leq \mathsf{M}(1/3)$
- $E[m T_{1/3} m^{-}] = E[-m T_{1/3} m] = M(1/3).$

#### <u>A quantitative Arrow Thm</u>

- <u>Arrow's</u>: f = dictator iff PDX(f) = 0.
- <u>Kalai 02</u>: Is it true that  $\forall \epsilon \exists \delta$  such that
- if PDX(f) < δ
- then f is ε close to dictator?
- <u>Kalai 02</u>: Yes if there are 3 alternatives and E[f] = 0.
- <u>M-11:</u> True for any number of alternatives.
- <u>Keller-11</u>: Optimal dependency between  $\delta \epsilon$ .
- Pf uses Majority is stablest and inverse\_hypercontractive inequalities (including quantitative Barbera Thm we saw).

#### Approximate Computational Hardness and Fourier Analysis

- Fourier Analysis plays an important role in hardness of approximation since the beginning.
- We follow with a brief overview of the connection to Gaussian techniques.
- Optimist CS: Design efficient algorithms.
- Pessimist CS: Problem is NP-hard.
- Optimist CS: Design efficient approximation algs.
- Pessimist CS: Prove: computationally hard to approximate.
- New methodology: "UGC hardness".

## Approximate Optimization

- Many optimization problems are NP-hard.
- Instead: Approximation algorithms
- These are algorithms that guarantee to give a solution which is at least
- $\alpha$  OPT or OPT  $\epsilon$ .
- S. Khot (2002) invented a new paradigm for analyzing approximation algorithms - called UGC (Ungiue Games Conjecture)

## THE UGC

- <u>UGC</u>: For all  $\epsilon > 0 \exists q s.t. given$
- n equations of the form  $x_i + x_j = c_{i,j} \mod q$
- It is <u>computationally hard</u> to distinguish between the following two scenarios:
- 1. It is possible to satisfy <u>at most €</u> fraction of the Equations simultaneously.
- It is possible to satisfy
- <u>at least  $1 \epsilon$  of the equations.</u>



## Example 1: The MAX-CUT Problem

- G = (V,E)
- C = (S<sup>c</sup>,S), partition of V
- w(C) =  $|(SxS^c) \cap E|$
- w : E ---> R<sup>+</sup>
- $w(C) = \sum_{e \in E \cap S \times S^c} w(e)$

## Example: The Max-Cut Problem

- OPT = OPT(G) =  $max_c \{|C|\}$
- MAX-CUT problem: find C with w(C)= OPT
- $\alpha$ -approximation: find C with w(C)  $\geq \alpha \cdot OPT$
- Goemans-Williamson-95:
- Rounding of





• Semi-Definite Program gives an  $\alpha$  = .878567 approximation algorithm.

## **MAX-Cut** Approximation

- Thm (KKMO = Khot-Kindler-M-O' Donnell, 2007):
- Under UGC, the problem of finding an
- $\alpha > a_{GW} = \min \{2 \theta / \pi (1 \cos \theta) : 0 < \theta < \pi\} = 0.87...$ approximation for MAX-CUT is NP-hard.
- Moral: Semi-definite program does the best!

 Thm (IM-2011): Same result for MAX-q-CUT assuming the Peace-Sign Conjecture.

## **MAX-Cut** Approximation

- Thm (KKMO):
- High level proof idea:
- Approximation factor is L/M where
- M = Opt E[f(x) f(y) : E[f] = 0]
- L = lim Opt E[f(x) f(y) : E[f]= 0, I(f) < ε}
- (x,y) have some "noise structure"
- Second quantity studied via invariance + Majority is Stablest.

## Other Approximation problems

- A second result using Invariance of M 08;10
- <u>Raghavendra 08</u>: Duality between Algorithms and Hardness for Constraint Satisfaction Problems.
- <u>Thm:</u> Every instance with gap β' < β can be used to prove UGC-based β'- hardness result!
- Implies Semi-definite programs with "optimal rounding" are optimal algorithms for optimization of Constraint Satisfaction Problems.



## Other Approximation problems

- After KKMO+MOO
- Dozens of papers use the same recipe
- → obtain optimal approximation ratio for many optimization problems.
- Best results use "general" invariance M-08;10.
- <u>Ex : Thm: (Austrin-M):</u>
- Predicates that are pairwise independent cannot be approximated better than random.



# Geometry behind Borell's results

- I. Ancient: Among all sets with  $v_n(A)$ = 1 the minimizer of  $v_{n-1}(\partial A)$  is A = Ball.
- II. Recent (Borell, Sudakov-Tsierlson 70's) Among all sets with  $\gamma_n(A) = a$ the minimizer of  $\gamma_{n-1}(\partial A)$  is A =Half-Space.



• III. More recent (Borell 85): For all  $\rho$ , among all sets with  $\gamma(A) = a$  the maximizer of E[A(N)A(M)] is given by A = Half-Space.

#### • <u>Thm1 ("Double-Bubble")</u>:

- Among all pairs of disjoint sets A,B with  $v_n(A) = a v_n(B) = b$ , the minimizer of  $v_{v-1}(\partial A \cup \partial B)$  is a "Double Bubble"
- <u>Thm2</u> ("Peace Sign"):
- Among all partitions A,B,C of R<sup>n</sup> with  $\gamma$ (A) =  $\gamma$ (B) =  $\gamma$ (C) = 1/3, the minimum of  $\gamma(\partial A \cup \partial B \cup \partial C)$  is obtained for the "Peace Sign"
- 1. Hutchings, Morgan, Ritore, Ros. + Reichardt, Heilmann, Lai, Spielman 2. Corneli, Corwin, Hurder, Sesum, Xu, Adams, Dvais, Lee, Vissochi



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Double bubbles

Newer Isoperimetric Results Conj (Isaksson-M, Israel J. Math 2011): For all  $0 \le \rho \le 1$ :

- $\operatorname{argmax} E[A(X)A(Y) + B(X)B(Y) + C(X)C(Y)]$ = "Peace Sign"
- Peace sign where max is over all partitions (A,B,C) of R<sup>n</sup> with  $\gamma_n(A) = \gamma_n(B) = \gamma_n(C) = 1/3$  is Later we'll see
- Thm (Exchangele Guass. Thm, IM-11):
- Let X, Y, Z be Gaussian vectors each with pairwise  $\rho \times Id$  covariance then
- argmax{  $E[A(X)A(Y)A(Z)]: \gamma_n(A) = \frac{1}{2}$  = half space.

# A proof of Borell's result

- Cute proof (Kinlder O'Donnell 2012):
- Let  $P(A) = \frac{1}{2}$ . Let M,N be  $\rho = \cos \theta$  correlated N(0,I)
- $q(\theta)$  :=  $P[N \in A, M \in A^c]$  =
- =P[N  $\in$  A, cos  $\theta$  N + sin  $\theta$  Z  $\in$  A<sup>c</sup>]
- $\leq kq(\theta/k).$
- For  $\theta = \pi/2$ ,  $p(\theta) = \frac{1}{4}$ .
- So q(π/2k) ≥ 1/(4k).
- For majority we get equality!
- $P[N_1 \in A, \cos \theta N_1 + \sin \theta Z_1 \in A^c] = \theta/(2 \pi).$

#### Summary

- Prove the "Peace Sign Conjecture" (Isoperimetry)
- $\Rightarrow$  "Plurality is Stablest" (Low Inf Bounds)
- $\Rightarrow$  MAX-3-CUT hardness (CS) and voting.
- $+ \Rightarrow$  Results in Geometry.

