Now what?

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Pilot Risk-Limiting Audits

• 17 pilot audits in CA, CO, and OH; another 13 planned.
• EAC funding for pilots in CA and CO and Cuyahoga County, OH
• CO has law; CA has pilot law
• simple measures, super-majority, multi-candidate, vote-for-
• multiple contests audited simultaneously with one sample
• contest sizes: 200 ballots to 121,000 ballots
• counting burden: 16 ballots to 7,000 ballots
• cost per audited ballot: nil to about $0.55
• several jurisdictions have audited on their own—no statistician required
What hasn’t been tried?

- Cross-jurisdictional contests
- IRV/RCV
“Data! Data! Data!” he cried impatiently. “I can’t make bricks without clay.”
–The Adventure of the Copper Beeches, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle
• data plumbing
• integrity of the audit trail
Now what?

- Demand convincing evidence that outcomes are right
- But don’t poison the well of LEO goodwill
- Mandate auditable systems (paper for now)
- Mandate/regulate ballot accounting, ballot manifests, security, chain of custody
- Mandate compliance audits
- As voting systems retire, replace with more-easily audited systems
- Re-vamp current certification regime; add conditions of use
- Build no-vendor systems: stop the money-pump
- Mandate ballot-polling risk-limiting audits for large contests until voting systems make comparison risk-limiting audits easier
- Don’t allow IRV/RCV until it can be audited
Legislation, Regulation

- White paper on risk-limiting audits
- Still hope to draft model legislation
- Colorado, California
- Risky legislation. Florida?
- RLA as a “brand”
- Interaction with recount laws
- Federal and state certification of equipment
Which really matters?

1. Under laboratory conditions, can the vote tabulation system—as delivered from the manufacturer—count votes with a specified level of accuracy?

2. As maintained, deployed, and used in the current election, did the vote tabulation system find the true winners?

Certification can cost millions and take years. Addresses Q 1.
Audits address Q 2.
Role and consequences of certification

Current certified systems make audits more expensive and less transparent than necessary.
Maintenance costs high; systems not agile; stupefying inertia.
Certification still useful for some things, e.g., to ensure accessibility and creation of durable audit trail.

Need to push for easily auditable systems using COTS components and free/open/cheap software.

Travis County TX and Los Angeles County CA are leaders.
Evidence-based Elections

Evidence = Auditability + Auditing

- (potentially) strongly software-independent voting system
- compliance audit to check integrity of audit trail: is system still SSI?
- risk-limiting audit to check outcomes
- puts incentives in the right place: better procedures and equipment mean less work for LEOs