Has anyone had much positive experience with PKI based smartcards, email
(S/Mime interoperability), programming to smart cards, etc.?
One area in particular that seems surprising is that a number of
projects are using cards like the Datakey 330 which seems to store data
in a way that is proprietary to particular card/reader driver versions.
I've been told, on the other hand, that Java PKI smart cards are very
interchangable and upward compatible.  The only reasons I've been able
to find so far for using the more 'proprietary' cards is that they may
be cheaper and further along in FIPS validation.
sdw
--
sdw@lig.net http://sdw.st
Stephen D. Williams 43392 Wayside Cir,Ashburn,VA 20147-4622
703-724-0118W 703-995-0407Fax Dec2001
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From fork-admin@xent.com  Fri Aug  9 18:16:26 2002

I'm sure this is common knowledge already, but just in case ...
http://security.tombom.co.uk/shatter.html
This paper presents a new generation of attacks against Microsoft
Windows, and possibly other message-based windowing systems. The
flaws presented in this paper are, at the time of writing,
unfixable. The only reliable solution to these attacks requires
functionality that is not present in Windows, as well as efforts on
the part of every single Windows software vendor. Microsoft has
known about these flaws for some time; when I alerted them to this
attack, their response was that they do not class it as a flaw -
the email can be found here. This research was sparked by comments
made by Microsoft VP Jim Allchin who stated, under oath, that there
were flaws in Windows so great that they would threaten national
security if the Windows source code were to be disclosed. He
mentioned Message Queueing, and immediately regretted it. However,
given the quantity of research currently taking place around the
world after Mr Allchin's comments, it is about time the white hat
community saw what is actually possible.
--
Gary Lawrence Murphy <garym@teledyn.com> TeleDynamics Communications Inc
Business Innovations Through Open Source Systems: http://www.teledyn.com
"Computers are useless.  They can only give you answers."(Pablo Picasso)
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