## 2008 Risk-Limiting Audits in California

The Pew Charitable Trusts Audit Workshop Salt Lake City, UT 23–24 February 2009

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Abstract: Post-election audits—comparisons of reported totals with hand counts of a trustworthy audit trail in a random sample of batches—can limit the risk of certifying an incorrect electoral outcome. The risk is the maximum chance the audit stops short of a full hand count when a full hand count would show that the outcome is wrong.

Risk-limiting audits can be built as sequential tests: Data are collected. If they give strong evidence that the outcome is right, the audit stops. Otherwise, more data are collected. Eventually, the audit stops or there has been a full hand count. Limiting the risk requires recognizing that each stage of the audit is a new opportunity to err.

There have been four risk-limiting audits, all in California in 2008: Marin County (a small measure in February requiring a supermajority and a county-wide measure in November), Santa Cruz County (County Supervisor, District 1, November), and Yolo County (bond measure). Several sampling techniques were tested. The audits ensured at least a 75% chance of a full hand count if that would change the outcome.

Many lessons were learned. Clear, precise and timely communication between the auditors and the elections officials is key. The biggest barrier is the inability of current election management systems (vote tabulation systems) to export data in a useful, machine-readable format. Insisting that vendors provide better data export should be a high priority. Adopting standard terminology and data formats would be extremely helpful.

## Machine (Voting System) Counting

- Want to count votes by machine: saves time and money (or so we are told).
- Machine counts are subject to various kinds of error. (So are hand counts, but they're the gold standard. Progress on accuracy, too.)
- Counting errors ⇒ risk that machines name the wrong winner.

**Risk-Limiting Audits** 

If the outcome is wrong, there's a at least a [pre-specified] chance of a full manual count

no matter what caused the outcome to be wrong, even if an evil adversary built the hardware and wrote the software.

The *risk* is the chance that there won't be a full hand count when a full hand count would show that the apparent outcome is wrong.

Essential that voters create complete, durable, accurate audit trail.

Essential that voting systems enable auditors to access reported results (total ballots, counts for each candidate, registered voters) in auditable batches.

Essential to select batches at random, *after* the results are posted. (Can supplement with "targeted" samples.)

Need a plan for dealing with discrepancies, possibly leading to full count. "Explanation" is not enough.

Current audit laws do not limit risk.

Process audits vs. materiality audits.

2008 Yolo County, CA Measure W Audit





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### Selecting batches at random

Software pseudo-random number generators: not transparent, hackable.

One ticket per precinct:

hard to verify; hard to mix (Vietnam draft).

2008 Oregon law uses one ticket per precinct; allows selections before publishing election results.

10-sided dice (Marin County) [Roll 1] [Roll 2]

Ping-pong balls (Alameda County) [Static] [Tumbling]

Alameda has 1204 precincts. Pick 1s digit, 10s, 100s. If result is between 205 and 999, stop. Else, remove 2–9 & pick 1000s digit.

Unintended consequences?

Logistic tradeoff

Errors and time for dice rolling, look-up tables (especially for PPS sampling).

Hybrid selection

November 2008 Marin & Santa Cruz audits)

Roll 10-sided dice to get a 6-digit seed. Use "good" open source PRNG to generate a sequence of numbers from the seed in a reproducible way. (Used the Mersenne Twister implemented in R) General principles

Margin small  $\Rightarrow$  less error required to change outcome.

Sample too small  $\Rightarrow$  sample can be likely to find few or no errors, even if outcome is wrong.

Sample big (compared with margin & error bounds)  $\Rightarrow$  likely to see big discrepancies in the sample if machines named wrong winner.

No look, no see: absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Rigorous statistical audit

If, for every way the outcome could be wrong, it would the audit is very likely to have found more error than it did find, stop.

Otherwise, keep counting.

If the audit stops without a full hand count, either the correct winner was named, or something very unlikely happened. Complete procedure says:

- how many batches to audit initially
- given the discrepancies in the audit sample, whether to stop or to expand the audit
- eventually declares "stop" or "full hand count."
- guaranteed minimum chance of full hand count if outcome is wrong, e.g., 90%

Only one basic approach so far does that.

#### Basic Idea

- 1. Pick the min chance  $1 \alpha$  of full manual count when result is wrong (the risk is  $\alpha$ ). Pick the max # of stages S. Allocate risk to stages:  $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_S$ .
- 2. Define batches and strata. Choose sampling scheme. Define "error." Set s = 1.
- 3. Draw sample and audit.
- 4. If, on the assumption that the outcome is wrong, the chance of seeing "so little" error is less than  $\alpha_s$ , stop. Otherwise, if s = S, count everything; but if s < S, increment s and go back to step 3.

5 February 2008 Marin County Measure A

First election ever audited to attain target level of confidence in the result.

Audited to attain 75% confidence that a full manual recount would find the same outcome.

Required 2/3 majority to pass. Margin 298 votes.

3 strata: in-precinct, VBM, provisionals

Confirmed outcome at no more than 25% risk (quite conservative)

## Marin Measure A audit timeline

Milestone	Date
Election day	5 February
Polling place results available	7 February
Random selection of polling place precincts	14 February
VBM results available	20 February
Random selection of VBM precincts	20 February
Hand tally complete	20 February
Provisional ballot results available	29 February
Computations complete	3 March

#### Costs:

\$1,501, including salaries and benefits for 4 people tallying the count, a supervisor, support staff to print reports, resolve discrepancies, transport ballots and locate and retrieve VBM ballots from the batches in which they were counted.

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$0.35 per ballot audited. 1\frac{3}{4} days.
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## Marin Measure B and Santa Cruz Supervisor District 1, November 2008

Used PPS sampling and trinomial bound.

County	Ballots	Winner	Loser	Prcts	Batches	Batches Audited	Ballots Audited	% Ballots Audited
Marin	121,295	51%	35%	189	544	14	3,347	3%
SC	26,655	45%	37%	76	152	16	7,105	27%

Marin: no discrepancies.

Santa Cruz: "taints" 0.036, 0.007, -0.002, -0.003, -0.005, -0.007, -0.012; twelve were 0.

Miscommunication about provisional ballots in Santa Cruz; treated as error.

# Yolo County Measure W, November 2008 Davis school bond. Required simple majority. Used SRS.

batches	yes	no	undervote	overvote	margin
114	25,297	8,118	3,001	2	17,179

Stop if no batch has more than 14 overstatements.

Assumed "small" batches were entirely in error; sampled from remaining 95.

Counted about 2,500 ballots by hand on 17 November 2008. 1 extra "yes" and 1 extra "no." Logistical issues: stratification, etc.

Samples for different counties drawn independently: stratified.

VBM, absentee & provisional ballots not counted right away.

Makes sense to start with a uniform sampling rate, then escalate as necessary.

#### Recap

- Auditing laws that address the problem fall short
- Good audits can limit the risk of certifying a wrong outcome
- There are practical ways to conduct risk-limiting audits
- Data plumbing is crucial! First step for any jurisdiction.

#### References

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More voting-related links: http://statistics.berkeley.edu/~stark/Vote/ index.htm