Big Ideas

Pilot audits

Ballot-level audits

▲□▶ ▲□▶ ▲ □▶ ▲ □▶ ▲ □ ● ● ● ●

Risk-Limiting Audits

Philip B. Stark

Department of Statistics University of California, Berkeley

16 June 2011 Colorado Secretary of State Risk-Limiting Audit Kick-off Meeting Denver, CO

Things to keep in mind

The difference between theory and practice is smaller in theory than it is in practice. (Various)

The purpose of elections is to convince the losers that they lost. (D. Wallach)

The [main] purpose of election audits is to convince everybody that the losers lost. (PBS)

What should audits do?

Pro forma audits

Most audit laws have no clear goal: "count and stop," or "count and report/explain discrepancies."

Compliance vs. materiality audits

Compliance: Were proper procedures followed? (e.g., secure chain of custody?) Materiality: Did any errors that occurred despite compliance matter?

Effective materiality audit

Correct the outcome if it is wrong.

Can require counting the entire audit trail by hand.

Pilot audits

Ballot-level audits



Risk-limiting Audit

Large, known chance of a full hand count if the outcome is wrong, thereby correcting the outcome.

Risk is maximum chance of failing to correct an apparent outcome that is wrong, no matter what caused the outcome to be wrong.

Risk-Limiting Audits in California

Marin County (February 2008; November 2008, 2009)

- Orange County (March 2011)
- Yolo County (November 2008, 2009)
- Santa Cruz County (November 2008)
- Monterey County (May 2011)

Measures requiring super-majority, simple measures, multi-candidate contests, vote-for-*n* contests.

Contest sizes ranged from about 200 ballots to 121,000 ballots.

Counting burden ranged from 32 ballots to 7,000 ballots.

Cost per audited ballot ranged from nil to about \$0.55.

Pilot audits

Ballot-level audits

2008 Yolo County, CA Measure W Audit





Goal of auditing

Big Ideas

Pilot audits

Ballot-level audits


TALLY SHEET	w Protogly then an area and and	23 TALLY SHEET
THE OTHER HARD IN THE AND	TALLY AS RUSTLAND with middles peed. The Danker of York Nut in Mining Date of	NUMBER OF VOTES CASE FOR EACH CANDIDATE
	an international and an and a second and as second and a	
	Reasureau pro had 1.5.3 when for	
	Norsaine yes Norsaine yes had 33 ma	$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $
J spla, No 	Scale 10 A Constants A constan	40: 40: 40: 10: 11: 41: 2: 4: <t< th=""></t<>
	hud for	OT T <tht< th=""> T T T</tht<>
41 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 9 9 9 9 1	had	
SIGN CERTIFICATE ON FRONT COVER		SIGN CERTIFICATE ON FRONT COVER

Goal of auditing

Big Ideas

Pilot audits

Ballot-level audits




AND

a tate

Arry

ot be

Pilot audits



2011 Orange County, first audit under AB 2023










Big Idea

Pilot audits







◆□▶ ◆圖▶ ◆臣▶ ◆臣▶

æ



Big Ideas

Pilot audits

Ballot-level audits

	No. of Contraction	and the second second
<section-header> <section-header> OPECTICAL BALLOCT /B SPECIA ALL MALLOCAL SPECIA ALLOCAL SPE</section-header></section-header>	ELECTION ORRESPONDENCIA Abdo De MONTEREY S, 3 DE MAYO DE 2011 NE Dand use feit ip parse provided and 01232	
NoPARTISAT NoPARTISAT DISTRICT DISTRICT ANTERF AVAILABLE MARTINE A		
 CA27-14066	4066 - 1	

Big Ideas

Pilot audits

Ballot-level audits

◆□ ▶ ◆□ ▶ ◆ 臣 ▶ ◆ 臣 ■ ● ● ● ●



Pilot audits

Ballot-level audits

< □ > < 同 > < Ξ > < Ξ > < Ξ > < Ξ < </p>

Batch size matters

100 bags of 100 jelly beans, various flavors. What fraction are coconut?

Compare pulling a bag at random to stirring all the beans together in a big pot and sampling 100 beans.

Vote-tabulation errors are like coconut jelly beans. Less information in checking bags of beans—or batches of ballots—than in checking the same number drawn individually from the "pot."

Yolo County Measure P, November 2009: For 10% risk limit, initial sample 6 batches, 1,437 ballots (11.33%).

Could have gotten 10% risk limit by checking 6 individual ballots (less than 0.05%).

Orange County Statutory Audit

Votes in one precinct counted by hand. No errors found.

Chance the 1% audit would find no errors even if the outcome is wrong could be over 88%.

The error rate in the sample says little about the error rate in the whole contest because the batch is large: One bag might have no coconut jelly beans, even though the rest have many.

Orange County Audits: Costs

Statutory Audit: \$257.68

Scales as the size of the contest: a contest twice as large would cost about twice as much to audit.

AB 2023 risk-limiting audit (10% risk): \$483.79 (not including my time or airfare) Would have cost essentially the same for any contest with the same

percentage margin, no matter how large the contest.

Only have to taste a teaspoon of soup to tell if the soup is too salty, no matter how big the pot-if it's stirred well.

Advantages of ballot-level RLA

Like sampling jelly beans from a big pot, instead of sampling bags of jelly beans.

- cheap (if technology supports it—working with vendors)
- fast and observable
- easy computations
- easy to explain

Tested in Yolo, Orange, and Monterey Counties.

Expect to audit two contests simultaneously in San Luis Obispo in September 2011.

Hope to have ballot-level audits in at least 15 California jurisdictions in 2012.

Secret sauce: have to associate individual CVRs with ballots.

Strategies for Colorado

- Need to understand systems at the county level: systems, procedures, logistical constraints.
- Parallel system versus modifications to existing systems.
- Parallel probably easier, closer to one-size-fits-all. Pros and cons.

Big-picture questions

- Need audit trail: paperless DREs are a problem.
- Need to curate audit trail.
- Need to check the integrity of the audit trail before the audit starts ("compliance audit")
- Need to "commit" to results before the audit starts.
- Need rules for public observation, etc.
- Need simple, usable rules for determining initial sample size, selecting batches or ballots at random, and stopping the audit.
- Need to figure out how to coordinate audits of multi-jurisdictional contests.